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Recent studies have conjectured that there may be a link between financial liberalization and
financial instability in emerging economies. Most of these studies, however, do not investigate
whether emerging economies are becoming structurally more vulnerable to currency and banking
crises. In this paper, we argue that emerging economies are systematically becoming more
susceptible to both currency and banking crises after FL. Using data for 27 emerging economies
from 1973 to the present, univariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the likelihood of
currency crises and banking crises increase after FL. In particular, liberalization allows more
liquidity to enter an emerging economy, which finds its way into productive and speculative
projects. What is common to both types of crises is a significant increase in speculative financing,
thereby increasing the chance for borrower default. Thus, the outflow of international capital
becomes more likely, and we find that the chance of either type of crisis grows faster in response
to changes in short-term loans after FL than before. Similarly, the reactions to overvalued
currencies are at least similar in terms of increasing probabilities of crises in the case of banking
crises, or greater in the case of currency crises after FL as compared to before FL. Further, our
results show that after FL the chance of a currency crisis declines over time, while the chance of
a banking crisis increases.
JEL Codes: F02; F36; F43
Keywords: Emerging economies; Financial liberalization; financial instability; currency crises;
banking crises 1
I.  Introduction
Financial turmoil seems to occur more frequently in emerging economies in recent years.
In particular, the Asian crisis hit shortly after the shock waves from the Mexican peso crisis in
1995 had subsided. Also, in a survey of banking sector problems, the IMF found that two thirds
of its member countries have experienced banking sector problems between 1980 and 1996
(Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, 1996). In almost all cases, we have witnessed  not only the
destabilization of the local banking system, but also the failure of the existing currency regime.
Financial systems play a central economic role, with their failure leading to serious
repercussions. Stable currencies facilitate cross-border movements of trade and capital, while
stable banking sectors help to channel savings to investors. Crises, then, adversely affect
international trade and capital flows, domestic credit, and output. These effects also don’t seem
to be isolated to the economies in question. Through international linkages, crises in one economy
are likely to spread to others, be they industrialized or less industrialized. Financial problems have
often resulted in severe output contractions, which can lead to worsened trade balances of major
trading partners and doubts over the repayment of international loans.
The literature reflects the significance of understanding financial instabilities, while it
seems to largely ignore one aspect, namely the impact of greater financial openness itself on
financial stability. In almost all studies, crises are seen to be triggered by what is perceived as an
outside change. The notion that financial liberalization (FL) in itself could be a cause for greater
fragility is only lately receiving some attention, and then only in a rather ad hoc fashion
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). However, building on the insights of Hyman Minsky
(1981; 1986) it can be argued that emerging economies become more vulnerable to both currency
and banking crises after FL. In this view, greater internal and external deregulation result in more
instabilities as greater liquidity is used increasingly for unsustainable, speculative expansions. This
is not to say that structural weaknesses may not raise the likelihood of crises, but that they are
unlikely to disappear in the wake of more deregulation. On the contrary, already existing
structural weaknesses are likely to become even more severe in a more deregulated environment.
Employing the framework developed by Minsky to explore currency and banking crises
offers considerable advantages over other approaches to the twin crises. While alternative
approaches ascribe the occurrence of twin crises often to common macro causes, they fail to
explore both the connection between financial market operations and deteriorating macro2
economic fundamentals, and the link between weaknesses in the foreign exchange markets and
the banking sector. By providing not only a consistent argument that links macro economic
fundamentals and financial market operations, but also supporting empirical evidence for the
growing vulnerability to currency and banking crises after FL, I hope to further our understanding
of the mechanics of financial crises, and the appropriate policies to combat these instabilities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, I present an argument which
connects FL to a greater likelihood of currency and banking crises. The theoretical argument
serves then as the basis for univariate and regression analysis in section III. Finally, some
concluding remarks follow in section IV.
II.  Financial Liberalization and Financial Crises
To avoid unnecessary confusion, I use the term currency and banking crises as commonly
defined in the literature. There, currency crisis are characterized by diminishing foreign exchange
reserves and rising short-term interest rates either by themselves or in combination with a
devaluation (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995; Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1995; Goldfaijn
and Valdés, 1997; Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998). Currency crises are distinct from
speculative attacks where a devaluation can be avoided. Bank crises, on the other hand, are
characterized by deposit or credit contractions in the wake of a bank run. An indication of a
looming bank crisis may be a deterioration of bank balance sheets, which often precedes a bank
run. However, a deterioration in the quality of bank balance sheets does not necessarily have to
lead to bank runs. In other words, increasing bad loan ratios are indicators for growing bank
sector instabilities, while bank failures are considered crises (Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, 1996).
How do currency and banking crises become more likely after financial liberalization (FL)?
FL is generally understood as the elimination of financial regulations in the domestic financial
markets, such as credit ceilings, lending requirements, or entry restrictions to reduce excess
demand for credit (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1995). Additionally, FL often comprises
external liberalization. That is, FL includes full or partial capital account opening, leading to the
potential of more short-term capital mobility and more foreign direct investment flows. Through
the elimination of internal and external government regulations, FL is supposed to make financial
markets more efficient, and thereby increasing the available amount of loanable funds for business
investments. For instance, banks should find it easier to attract deposits after the elimination of
interest rate ceilings and with greater access to international capital markets. Similarly, banks3
should be more willing to supply loans as interest rate restrictions are eliminated, and as domestic
financial market competition increases. Consequently, financial stability should increase with FL
as financial intermediaries supposedly become more efficient. 
Lately, a critique of FL as financial market policy has been developed based on Minsky’s
(1981, 1986) “financial instability hypothesis” (Grabel, 1993). In particular, the initial economic
improvements often observed after the introduction of FL are fuelling and are driven by overly
optimistic expectations, and hence are not sustainable in the long run. In other words, additional
liquidity may not go to the most productive uses, but it may find its way into speculative projects,
thereby generating, on the one hand, short-term gains, but also, on the other hand, destabilizing
conditions for both the domestic currency as well as the domestic banking sector.
It is important to realize that financial deregulation may lead to short-term economic gains,
and hence may fuel optimistic expectations, which ultimately produce the conditions that
destabilize the liberalizing economy’s currency and its banking sector. As domestic financial
markets become more liberalized, credit may be expanded to sectors that were previously credit
constrained, mainly because rising real interest rates promise more profits. This greater liquidity
might increase business investment. With higher real rates and with expanding real and financial
sectors, more funds are then attracted from overseas. More capital inflows, though, may lead to
a real currency appreciation, hence attracting even more capital. 
The key to understanding the link between FL and a greater likelihood of currency and
banking crises is that rather than a stable equilibrium, changes in economic fundamentals may
merely produce periods of tranquility (Minsky, 1986). Two aspects are of particular importance
here: a continued appreciation helps to attract capital, and deregulated financial markets, in
particular capital markets, may promise short-term gains. Both a continued overvaluation and the
diversion of liquidity into asset markets can generate speculative financing, thereby destabilizing
currencies and banks. Particularly, an overvalued exchange rate hurts the real sector through a
deterioration in the terms of trade. Also, additional liquidity invested in short-term speculative
assets diverts funds from business investment finance, especially since capital markets early during
FL may promise high growth rates. In other words, the financial sector continues to grow due to
real exchange rate and asset market gains, thereby creating the conditions for a real economic
slow down. This growing likelihood of a disparity between the financial and the real sector reflects
the increasing speculative nature of finance in liberalized economies often observed (Grabel, 1998;
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996; Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996; Sheng, 1996; Benink and4
Llewellyn, 1994b; Balino and Sundararajan, 1991). 
More speculative financing, though, raises the likelihood of borrower default, and hence
the default risk for lenders and the chance of a currency devaluation of the already overvalued
currency. Default risk increases due to a number of factors inherent in FL. First, it may rise simply
because the financial sectors expands at the same time as the real sector already slows down.
Second, default risk may also rise due to increased foreign currency borrowing in the wake of an
appreciating currency. An appreciating currency provides an incentive to borrowers to take out
foreign currency denominated loans, thereby raising the chance of borrower default in the case
of a currency devaluation. Finally, monetary authorities may be tempted to tighten their stance on
money to stabilize their overvalued exchange rate, thereby inducing a real slow down, and making
loan repayment harder for domestic borrowers. 
With a rise in default risk, though, the likelihood of the withdrawal of short-term funds
increases, too. If short-term funds, which have been used to fund long-term projects, are
withdrawn, a credit crunch ensues, and lenders are forced to recall outstanding loans, thereby
depressing investments. Importantly, short-term funds can and will be withdrawn at short notice
if investors anticipate economic difficulties. Ironically, large scale capital inflows may have helped
to generate an overvaluation, and fuelled a speculative financing boom, which may now make a
devaluation, increasing borrower default, and therefore capital outflows more likely.
An overvaluation which has helped to attract capital inflows by raising optimistic
expectations about an economy’s future performance, may at the same time foster an economic
slowdown (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996; Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995; Krugman,
1995b). It is important to note that the likelihood of a currency devaluation grows, the longer an
overvaluation persists. In particular, an overvalued currency is one of the main contributing
factors for a growing disparity of the real and the financial sector. A continuously overvalued
currency raises the price of exports, and therefore adds to the slow down of the real sector, while
at the same time enticing domestic investors to borrow more heavily in foreign currencies.
Considering, however, that a continued overvaluation has adverse real consequences, capital
outflows become more likely. To avoid massive capital outflows monetary authorities may try to
sustain an overvaluation by spending official reserves or by tightening money. As reserves are
eventually depleted or the real sector slows down, a devaluation may be unavoidable, giving
international investors an incentive to withdraw their funds, and making foreign currency loans
more difficult to repay, thereby creating a credit crunch, and furthering an economic slowdown.1  In empirical studies on financial crises, rising interest rates abroad appear to have a significantly
negative impact on the stability of an emerging financial system (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996;
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995). 
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Besides a real economic decline, a lower interest rate differential due to rising interest
rates abroad may also result in net capital outflows
1. However, capital outflows grow only if
domestic money is not tightened, which puts monetary authorities in a bind. If domestic rates are
not increased, a large scale capital outflow may create a credit crunch. However, if domestic rates
are raised, the real sector may slow down regardless as demand is dampened.
Adding to the greater chance of crises as a result of speculative financing based on large
capital inflows, which are, in turn, driven by short-term financial market gains, is the fact, that
government finances are simultaneously becoming strained. The need to support either domestic
banks or domestic currencies comes in the wake of already deteriorating economic fundamentals,
in particular a slowing down real sector. Hence, currency and banking crises may raise the demand
on government budgets, when revenues are decreasing and expenditures are rising. 
While I have mainly focussed on destabilizing macro trends, such as speculative credit
expansions, or currency overvaluations, it should be noted, that the fate of the domestic banking
sector is inherently linked to these macro trends due to the central role banks play in any
economy, but particularly in emerging economies. That is, internal and external deregulation
exposes domestic banks to increasing default, maturity, exchange rate and interest rate risks, and
hence makes banking crises more likely. Thus, currency and banking crises alike are reflections
of the greater vulnerability of emerging economies to financial turmoil after the introduction of
FL.
Obviously, financial liberalization does not have to lead inevitably to crises. It does,
however, raise the likelihood of crises, which can be diminished by government policies. So far,
I have argued that FL as financial market policy is destabilizing rather than stabilizing, with one
possible exception, though. FL includes an opportunity for more international financial
competition from multinational bank (MNB) entry, which may reduce the risks banks incur. It is
likely that banks reduce their risk exposure once they find themselves in competition with MNBs.
In other words, if a bank's net worth is above its safety threshold for prudent lending, more
international competition may lead a bank to reduce its credit, such that it can lower its loan and
risk exposure. The reduction in domestic bank credit is greater if MNBs engage in "cherry6
picking" leaving only borrowers of lesser quality. Obviously, the more a bank reduces its credit
the less it is exposed to any of the above described risks, and the less likely it is to engage in
speculative financing, thereby also lowering the chance of currency crises.
While proponents of the standard FL framework would argue that internal and external
liberalization should increase the efficiency, and thereby the stability of the local financial system,
the argument laid out here leads to the opposite conclusion. Greater financial market openness
should increase the likelihood of financial crises after FL since the deregulated environment allows
for a dynamic environment which fosters speculative finance built upon overly optimistic
expectations. It is important to note that these overly optimistic expectations are borne out of
initially improving economic fundamentals, and that these improvements lay the foundation for
future instabilities. In other words, if liberalizing economies do not improve their regulatory
structure before liberalization, crises after FL should be the rule rather than the exception.
III.  Empirical Tests
I turn now to testing empirically whether there is evidence for a growing vulnerability to
currency and banking crises in emerging economies after FL. To do so, I develop first testable
hypotheses with regards to both the determinants of banking and of crises before and after FL.
Then, I provide univariate and multivariate tests for these hypotheses, again separately for banking
and currency crises. While my analysis begins with banking crises, and continues with currency
crises, there is no clear indication that either ordering is superior to the other.
III.1.1 Univariate Analysis for Banking Crises
From the previous discussion, we can derive a few hypotheses regarding the chance of
banking crises before and after FL. In general, financial systems are exposed to greater default,
maturity, interest rate and exchange rate risks after internal and external liberalization. Due to a
larger possibility for speculative financing, we would expect a growing default risk, and with it
increasing financial instability due to the greater exposure to other risks. Because of the larger
default risk, the support the government can offer, as well as the stabilizing impact of international
financial competition, should decline prior to a crisis.
First, default risk arises from optimistic credit expansions, which are captured by the level2 See the appendix for a complete list of variables, definitions and sources. 
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and the growth of production and of real credit
2. Signs for speculative financing are a widening
gap between production and credit, which should appear in the months before a crisis. Further,
the responsiveness to speculative financing should be greater after FL. For the same increase in
speculative financing, the chance that a banking crisis occurs should grow more after FL.
As a result of a greater default risk maturity, exchange rate, and interest risks should
become more likely to materialize. Hence, second, greater maturity risk should result from more
short-term capital inflows, measured by the level and growth of short-term debt relative to
reserves. Thus, capital inflows relative to official reserves should be larger directly before a crisis,
and the response in terms of the chance of a crisis, should again be greater after FL. 
Third, the interest rate risk is closely related to short-term capital inflows, where the risk
of capital outflows increases with a narrowing interest rate differential. Especially after FL, the
interest rate differential should widen immediately before a crisis as a sign of a tighter monetary
policy. Also, the reaction in terms of crisis likelihood should be larger after FL than before. 
Fourth, the risk that the exchange rate will be devalued depends on the level of
overvaluation, measured by the real exchange rate’s deviation from its non-crisis period mean.
Generally, the overvaluation should be greater prior to a banking crisis, and reactions to an
overvaluation should be more pronounced after FL. 
Fifth, the impact of international competition, which is expected to be stabilizing, yet
declining in the months prior to a crisis as domestic speculative financing grows, is captured by
the level and growth of MNB credit relative to total credit. 
Finally, possible strains on the government budget are captured by real deposits, real M1,
and the ratio of current account balances to reserves, while the support a government can offer
is proxied by the growth of official reserves. It is expected that the strains become greater prior
to crisis. That is, there should be a monetary expansion, which may cause implicit or explicit
insurance problems, e.g. through deposit insurance schemes. Simultaneously, the government’s
means to stabilize its financial sector weaken prior to crises, which should be reflected in a
declining growth rate of official reserves. With liberalization, the reactions to these trends should
become more pronounced than before FL.  
As my focus is on demonstrating that the economic structure changes immediately before
a crisis, and that these changes are different after FL than before, the observations are separated3 To avoid problems associated with different units, only percentages and indexes are used. 
4  I use a Wilcoxon rank sum test where a positive sign indicates that the mean prior to a crisis as
compared to tranquil periods, or the mean after FL as compared to before FL is smaller. 
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twice. First, observations occur either before or after FL has been introduced. Since all FL policies
are often not introduced at once, the elimination of interest rate restrictions is chosen as the
beginning of FL (Fry, 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Second, each observation
can occur during crisis times or during non-crisis times. Banking crises, however, are hard to
identify, mainly because of data limitations. Here, I classify as banking crises bad loan ratios of
more than 10%, ”bank runs that lead to closure, merging or takeover by the public sector of one
or more financial institutions, [or].. if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-
scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions), that
marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions” (Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1996:6; Sundararajan and Balino, 1992; Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996; Sheng, 1996).
In each case, the variables are measured as the deviation from their mean during non-crisis times,
thereby controlling for country and time specific differences in each variable
3. Put differently,
through this manipulation, I am able to elicit systematic differences that are common to all
economies. To show the robustness of the results, the deviations are recorded 18 or 24 months
prior to a crisis, while the actual crisis and the 18 or 24 months after the crisis are excluded
4.
The results in table 2 suggest that the two-way split of the data into observations for crisis
and non-crisis periods both before and after FL seems to be justified, as the changes appear to be
significantly different prior to a crisis for the two sub-periods. In particular, the univariate analysis
supports the hypothesis that after FL banking crises are characterized by more optimistic credit
expansions. Thus, maturity, interest rate, and exchange rate risk should become more likely to
materialize, especially as interest rate and exchange rate risks appear to be greater prior to crises.
As mentioned earlier, we are first looking for signs of growing default risk in the months
leading up to a crisis, especially after FL. Here, the level of real credit is larger for the months
directly before a crisis, regardless of the subset, while the growth rate of real credit is declining
prior to crises before FL, and increasing at the same time after FL. Further, real credit goes to
financing an expanding real sector before FL, while it is lent out to a real sector that is slowing
down as both the level and the growth rate of industrial production indicate.
With signs of a growth in default risk, we are now turning to the other risks. Maturity risk5
  The fact that the ratio of short-term loans to reserves is smaller after FL is obviously not an
indication that short-term borrowing is larger before FL as table 1 shows. Financial fragility arises
from the use of additional funds for speculative financing, which appears to be greater after FL.
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seems to remain unchanged prior to crisis after FL, whereas it appears to grow before FL. Both
the level and change in short-term loans to reserves are larger in the months directly before a crisis
before FL, while they are statistically the same after FL (see also table 1)
5. Further, interest rate
risk may  grow in the months before a crisis after FL, where the real interest rate seems to
increase before a crisis, thus making a future interest rate decrease more likely. Also, prior to FL,
the interest rate differential is narrowing before a crisis, making capital outflows in fact more
likely than with a steady differential as is the case after FL. Finally, the exchange rate risk seems
to grow only after FL, where the real exchange rate shows signs of an overvaluation. In fact, prior
to FL, there is some indication that the real exchange rate depreciates immediately before a crisis.
Thus, the deterioration of the current account balance after FL may be connected to the
overvalued exchange rate, while the same deterioration in the current account balance before FL
may be determined by other factors. What impact the changes in the three risk categories have on
the likelihood of a banking crisis, has to be determined in multivariate analysis further below. 
The various risk categories may increase and the likelihood of a crisis may still decline due
to some compensating factors, such as government support, or international financial competition.
In the months before a crisis, real deposits are greater than during non-crisis times in both
subperiods. However, real M1 shrinks immediately before a crisis before FL, while it grows at the
same time after FL. Also, the current account balance relative to reserves becomes more negative
prior to a crisis (table 1), thereby already limiting the scope of a government’s support
possibilities. Overall, the strains on the government seem to be greater after FL than before, while
changes in official reserves, the main source for financial support here appears to be the same.
Further, international financial competition loses its already relatively low importance prior to a
crisis after FL, while it grows before FL.
III.1.2 Multivariate Analysis for Banking Crises
So far, the discussion has relied on univariate analyses, which ignores joint effects of the
explanatory variables. For instance, the univariate results indicate more speculative financing after
FL, which should increase the vulnerability to international capital mobility. Other factors, though,6
 Fixed effects merely refers to the assumed correlation structure in the regression. Country fixed
effects cannot be used since they would introduce an automatic selection bias as countries with
no banking crisis during the sampling period would be eliminated in the estimation procedure. 
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such as short-term debt relative to official reserves indicate a lower chance of crisis after FL. Only
by incorporating the risks and countervening forces simultaneously can we determine if the chance
of a crisis has changed after FL. Here, I expand the analysis by using a logistic regression, which
has the advantages that it investigates the effects of a variety of variables simultaneously, and that
it controls for dynamic changes by including observations for tranquil and pre-crises periods. 
For the regression, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which takes the value
of one during the 18 months prior to a banking crisis, and the value zero otherwise. Similar to the
univariate analysis the 18 months after a crisis and the actual crisis period are excluded. Further,
in the selection of explanatory variables, I have considered a number of factors. First, we have
chosen levels, rather than changes of industrial production, real credit, or short-term debt relative
to reserves since their interpretation is more straightforward. Second, due to a high degree of
collinearity we have excluded the real interest rate, and retained the interest rate differential, since
monetary policy responses are also captured by real M1 and M2. Third, as the inclusion of some
variables would unduly limit the number of observations, I have excluded the MNB variables. 
To study the impact of a number of factors on the likelihood of banking crises in emerging
economies, I first estimate the relevant coefficients for each subset by using a fixed effects logistic
regression
6. A greater vulnerability to banking crises will be demonstrated if the chance of a
banking crisis increases more after FL in response to the same economic fundamentals. This
appears to be the case as regressions (1) and (2) in table 3 show. For instance, the slowing down
of industrial production in the months prior to crisis after FL, also increases the likelihood of a
banking crisis significantly. In contrast, the growth in industrial production prior to FL, does not
significantly reduce the chance of a banking crisis. Further, an expansion of real credit prior to FL
reduces the likelihood of a crisis, whereas it significantly increases the chance of a banking crisis
after FL. Thus, the different reactions to real credit may reflect a larger emphasis on speculative
financing after FL. As the regression results suggest more speculative financing after FL than
before, it may not be surprising to find somewhat stronger reactions to changes in the level of
short-term loans relative to reserves after FL. With respect to the other risk categories, namely
interest rate and exchange rate risks, there do not appear any significant differences, which means11
that during both sub-periods a narrowing real interest rate differential has no impact on the chance
of a crisis, and that an overvaluation leads to a significant increase in the chance of a banking
crisis. Thus, the greater exposure to various risks after FL, also leads to a greater likelihood of
banking crises after FL. Put differently, the possible countervening forces to the observed
increases in default risk and exchange rate risk before a crisis after FL do not appear to
compensate for the greater risks. This is also demonstrated by the fact that faster growth in
official reserves does not reduce the chance of a banking crisis as it does prior to FL. Also,
improvements in the current account balance show the same sign for both periods, suggesting that
emerging economies would to have to experience greater absolute improvements in the current
account balance after FL than before as significantly larger risks have to be compensated. One
aspect seems to improve after FL, namely the reactions to financial intermediation as greater real
deposits reduce the chance of a crisis after FL, but raise it prior to FL. Hence, this is an indication
that increased domestic liquidity improves a banking system’s stability rather than destabilizing
it. 
It may be argued that the multivariate results showing a greater chance for banking crises
after FL are dominated by some turbulences during a transitory stage. To account for the impact
of time after FL, we first introduce a logged time trend. It is expected that policymakers become
more familiar with the deregulated environment and are consequently better able to respond to
destabilizing trends the longer an economy has been liberalized. In this case, the logged time trend
represents something like a “national learning curve”. The results of regression (3) in table 3 show
that the prior results are robust, and that the longer an economy has been liberalized the greater
the likelihood of a crisis becomes. In other words, policy makers may also become caught up in
a “deregulation euphoria”, thereby increasing the chance of a banking crisis. The second
alternative to control for the effects of time is to introduce fixed effects for each month since FL
has been introduced as in regression (4) of table 3. The results indicate the robustness of the
previous results, thereby showing again that after controlling for the time that has passed since
FL has been introduced emerging economies are still more susceptible to currency crises. 
III.2.1 Univariate Analysis for Currency Crises
As the univariate and multivariate results indicate a greater vulnerability to banking crises
in emerging economies after FL, mainly because of a greater default risk resulting from overly
optimistic credit expansions, the question arises whether we can also observe an increase in the12
likelihood of currency crises after FL. In particular, we would expect a growing vulnerability to
currency crises to be reflected in a number of trends before and after FL. Using macro data for
an array of sources I can employ again the same univariate and multivariate tests to see whether
the vulnerability to currency crises increases after FL. 
First, measures of speculative financing should be better indicators of crises after FL than
before FL. In particular, we should observe both overly optimistic credit expansions and asset
market bubbles in the months leading up to a crisis, and more importantly, a greater response to
it after FL. As investors can withdraw their funds faster after FL, they can also more easily
respond to deteriorating fundamentals and cause a crisis. For overly optimistic credit expansions
I include the levels and growth rates of industrial production and real credit, while the growth rate
of the stock market index serves as a proxy for asset market bubbles. If speculative financing is
indeed increasing, we should observe a divergence between real and financial trends prior to crisis,
and an above average build-up in the asset market. Further, a larger increase in the likelihood of
a crisis should result after FL given the same changes in production, credit or asset markets.
Second, I would expect the importance of short-term capital flows to increase in
determining an economy’s vulnerability to crises. To account for the effects of capital mobility
I include the level and growth of short-term debt to reserves, the interest rate differential with the
US, and exchange rate overvaluation. Short-term debt, the interest rate differential and the
overvaluation should be greater immediately before a crisis. Also, the responsiveness to these
trends should be greater after FL due to greater capital mobility, which should be reflected in a
larger change in the crisis probability in response to the same change in these three variables.
Third, in connection with increased capital inflows, and an overvaluation, I would expect
the current account balance to deteriorate. Thus, I include the current account balance relative
to reserves here, which is expected to be lower prior to a crisis as compared to tranquil periods.
Further, I would expect the chance of a crisis to increase more after FL than before FL given the
same decline in the current account balance as capital has become more mobile. 
Fourth, in the months leading up to a crisis I would expect to see signs of stabilizing
measures by the government. In particular, we should observe monetary tightening, measured by
the real interest rate, and the sale of official reserves, accounted for by the growth rate of official
reserves. Also, the need for stabilizing measures is reflected in a faster growth of real M1 and M2,
before a crisis. Due to the greater openness after FL, and the resulting greater liquidity, these
trends may be more pronounced after FL than before. Put differently, the likelihood of a crisis7
 Even though MNBs operate in more regulated economies, their operations are often restricted
in such a way that they do not directly compete with domestic banks. 
8 This assumes that MNBs do not engage in speculative financing as domestic banks do.  
13
should increase more after FL given the same change in interest rates, money or reserves. 
Finally, the presence of MNBs after FL should lower the risk of currency crises as it
induces banks to engage in less speculative financing
7. Here, the ratio of MNB credit relative to
total credit and its change measure the competitive impact of MNBs, which is expected to decline
when overall credit increases in the months leading up to a crisis, and after FL
8. 
Since I am interested in showing that the economy changes just before a crisis, and that
the economic environment is different after FL than before, the data is separated twice. First, I
divide the data into observations that occur before and after FL has been introduced. Since all FL
policies are often not introduced at once, the elimination of interest rate restrictions is chosen as
the beginning of FL (Fry, 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Second, I classify each
observation whether it occurs during crisis times or during non-crisis times within each subset.
To determine which months are crisis months, I use a currency crisis index which is constructed
as weighted average of changes in the nominal exchange rate (relative to the US dollar), and of
changes in official reserves (Eichengreen, Wyplosz and Rose, 1995, 1994a, 1994b; Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1996). The weights of each component are chosen such that the conditional volatilities
are the same. A crisis is then defined as a deviation of the index of more than three standard
deviations from its mean. The 18 (or 24) months prior to a crisis are considered pre-crisis periods.
What do the results (table 4) tell us about macro trends in emerging economies prior to
currency crises? The results suggest that the two way differentiation in the data is again justified.
In both subsets, most variables show clear differences between tranquil periods and the pre-crisis
months indicating that economic environment destabilizes in the 1-2 years prior to a crisis.
Further, most variables are different in the pre-crisis months before and after FL. Hence, our
results support the argument that emerging economies’ structure changes with FL.
The individual results tend to support some of our above hypotheses. Most importantly,
I find evidence for more speculative financing after FL, which may have serious repercussions,
especially since it could mean a larger chance of borrower default. Aside from a greater chance
of borrower default, the results are mixed with respect to the consequences of external
liberalization, especially when it comes to current account balance, exchange rate overvaluation,9
 That this seems to contradict some of the summary statistics in table 2, which depends on the
standard deviation of the estimates. Hence, the non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum is a better
indicator than simply “eyeballing” the various period averages, particularly with smaller samples.
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interest rate differential and international financial competition.
First, crises are characterized by speculative financing, especially after FL. Real credit
increases more prior to a crisis than in tranquil periods and more after FL than before, while
industrial production declines to the same degree before and after FL just before a crisis. The
divergence between the real and the financial sector becomes even more pronounced when we
look at the growth rates of production and real credit (see also table 1). Prior to FL, industrial
production grows at the same rate as before, while real credit growth declines. In contrast,
industrial production growth slows after FL, whereas real credit growth remains the same
9.
Further, there is not much initial support for asset bubbles before a crisis as stock market growth
is higher during non-crisis times. As stock market growth, however, seems to reach its peak about
one year before a crisis, as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) already found, it is possible that the end
of an asset market bubble precedes a crisis. Considering that the decline in asset market growth
is larger after FL, it is likely that the previous asset market bubble is also greater after FL, which
would speak for more speculation in a deregulated environment.
Second, the univariate results with respect to international capital mobility are mixed. For
instance, emerging economies experience real exchange rate overvaluations and subsequent
current account balance declines leading up to a crisis, particularly before FL, while the real
interest rate differential declines faster during pre-crisis months, particularly after FL. This may
increase the chance of a crisis, especially if short-term debt increases just before a crisis. Before
and after FL, short-term loans relative to reserves are greater prior to crisis, especially before FL,
leaving emerging economies generally more exposed to capital mobility, but less so after FL.
Interestingly, though, the 12-month change in short-term loans relative to reserves falls below its
non-crisis period average before FL. In fact, the change in short-term debt becomes negative prior
to crisis before FL, while it turns positive after FL (table 1). Thus, there is an indication for a
general reduction in short-term debt after FL, except in the months prior to a crisis, whereas there
seems to be a larger build-up of short-term debt that is being reduced prior to crises before FL.
Thus, the results may not necessarily indicate a greater exposure to short-term capital mobility,
but an increasing one after FL, in contrast to an decreasing one before FL.    15
Fourth, the governments appear to try to stabilize their currencies through the sale of
official reserves, while a monetary expansion continues in the months prior to a crisis. The growth
rate of official reserves falls below its non-crisis average, especially after FL. Real M1 and M2,
though, seem to be undisturbed by this as they increase above their non-crisis levels prior to
crises, possibly aided by a declining real interest rate. 
Finally, MNBs seem to increase their lending more than domestic banks prior to crisis. The
MNB credit market share rises above its non-crisis averages in the months leading up to a crisis,
particularly after FL. Considering that real credit is growing faster in the months before a crisis,
the results indicate that MNBs are aiding a lending boom, rather than stabilizing the domestic
financial system. How large, however, the overall impact of MNBs is, remains questionable since
their credit market share seems to be below 1%. 
III.1.2 Multivariate Analysis for Currency Crisis
So far, the discussion has relied on univariate analyses, thereby again ignoring possible
joint effects. For instance, the univariate results indicate more speculative financing after FL,
which should increase the vulnerability to international capital mobility. Other factors, though,
such as the real exchange rate or the current account balance, indicate a lower chance of crisis
after FL. The various factors are included in a logistic regression where the dependent variable
takes the value of one during the 18 months prior to a currency crisis, and the value zero
otherwise. Similar to the univariate analysis the 18 months after a crisis and the actual crisis period
are excluded.
In the selection of the explanatory variables, we have considered the same factors as for
banking crises. Hence, industrial production, real credit, and short-term debt relative to reserves
along with the interest rate differential, real M1 and M2, the current account balance relative to
reserves, the growth of official reserves, and the real exchange rate are included.
To see which factors determine the chance of a currency crisis before and after FL, I
estimate fixed effects logistic models for both subsets. Regressions (1) and (2) in table 5 show that
the determinants of currency crisis vary between the two sub-periods, as the statistical comparison
indicates. In particular, the parameter estimates for industrial production are negative, and smaller
after FL than before. Put differently, industrial production has to increase more after FL to
achieve the same reduction in the likelihood of a crisis as before FL. Second, the estimates for real
credit are positive, and slightly more so after FL than before, indicating that a credit expansion16
leads to a greater increase in the chance of a banking crisis after FL. Next, short-term loans have
a greater destabilizing effect and improvements of the current account balance have a smaller
stabilizing impact after FL. Similarly, faster reserve accumulations have a smaller stabilizing effect
after FL than before. However, overvalued exchange rates have a stronger destabilizing effect
after FL than before. Finally, the money variables appear to have opposite effects before and after
FL. While an expansion of M1 is stabilizing before FL, it seems to be destabilizing after FL. An
increase in M2, though, seems to destabilize a currency before FL, and stabilize it after FL.
While the multivariate results largely confirm the univariate findings, the question remains
as to whether emerging economies become more susceptible to currency crises after FL than
before. The results show that speculative financing has a stronger destabilizing effect after FL than
before, as does an overvalued currency or short-term international loans. The potentially
stabilizing impact of improving current account balances or faster growing official reserves are
weaker after FL than before. Finally, real M1 increases have a larger destabilizing impact after FL,
whereas positive real M2 changes have a smaller stabilizing effect after FL than before. In other
words, given the same set of economic fundamentals the chance of a banking crisis grows after
FL. Thus, the results not only show a structural difference after FL, they also suggest that this
new structure in liberalized emerging economies is systematically more unstable than emerging
economies before FL. 
Given that the vulnerability to currency crisis grows after liberalization, we are still facing
the possibility that the multivariate results presented here capture some turbulences in the early
stages of FL, rather than underlying structural weaknesses. To control for this potential timing
effect, we have again first added a logged time trend to the regression (table 5), which represents
again a “national learning curve”. As regression (1) indicates, the time trend has the expected
negative sign, indicating that the chance of a crisis does in fact decline the longer ago FL has been
introduced. Regression (1) also shows that the results remain largely unchanged as compared to
the results without a time trend, indicating that the relative importance of the economic variables
does not shrink, but rather that stabilizing factors with respect to currency crises are improving.
Alternatively, we include time fixed effects, i.e. dummies for each month that has passed since the
introduction of FL, which allows us to control for time specific changes after FL. The results are
reported in regression (2), with the main results by and large the same as compared to the results
without controlling for time effects. The inclusion of time effects in the regression changes only
the effect of industrial production notably as the estimated parameter becomes positive. Put17
differently, increases in industrial production raise the chance of a currency crisis, which may
reflect tendencies of overinvestment in the face of increasing liquidity. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
In this paper, we have argued that the vulnerability of emerging economies to currency
and banking crises increases after financial opening. This argument is supported by univariate and
multivariate tests for both banking and currency crises. Hence, this paper provides insights into
the structural weaknesses that become more prevalent after FL, and that should be countered with
adequate policies.
Our results indicate that the vulnerability to both types of crises increases after internal and
external liberalization. In particular, external liberalization allows more liquidity to enter an
emerging economy, which, put somewhat simplified, can then, thanks to internal liberalization,
find its way into productive and speculative projects. What is common to both types of crises is
a significant increase in the divergence between real and financial trends, which is taken as an
indication for growing trend of more speculative financing. As production and credit drift apart
prior to crises, the chance of a crisis increases faster after FL than before. With a larger chance
of borrower default in emerging economies, the outflow of international capital becomes more
likely, and it seems hence not surprising to find that the chance of either type of crisis grows faster
in response to changes in short-term loans after FL than before. Similarly, the reactions to
overvalued currencies are at least similar in terms of increasing probabilities of crises in the case
of banking crises, or greater in the case of currency crises after FL. Interestingly, the chance of
currency crisis declines over time after FL, even though the reactions to economic fundamentals
remain similar, which suggests that other stabilizing institutions, such as more transparency, may
be improving. In contrast, the chance of a banking crisis seems to increase with time, which may
indicate a growing optimism on the part of regulators. 
Does our research then suggest that greater financial openness should not be pursued as
a policy goals in emerging markets? Clearly, this study shows that financing is not necessarily
going where it is supposed to go in a less regulated environment, thus opening the possibility for
crises. This implies a few conclusions. First, any economy which wants to liberalize its financial
system should evaluate its need to liberalize very carefully. In particular, the rationale for FL is
based on the assertion that a developing economy is mired in excess demand for credit. If such
excess demand is not apparent, or if excess supply exists instead, other arguments in favor of18
liberalization have to be even more compelling. Second, if a decision is cast in favor of
liberalization the necessary institutions to stabilize the banks and currencies should be in place
before opening one’s borders. In other words, since greater vulnerability does not seem to be a
string of exceptional cases, but rather a structural phenomenon, such institution building seems
a necessary precondition rather than an acceptable afterthought to financial liberalization. 19
Appendix: A. Tables
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BANKING AND CURRENCY CRISES 
Variable Before FL After FL

















Industrial Production 83.510 83.653 87.769 86.148 83.017 109.473 109.353 108.369 108.727 116.585
Industrial Production Growth 3.849 4.015 2.027 4.346 5.246 5.646 6.373 5.346 6.760 2.635
Real Credit 93.876 95.015 84.542 81.910 106.585 123.75 115.454 152.002 119.595 164.440
Real Credit Growth 6.620 6.627 9.067 6.800 8.255 7.115 6.594 11.582 6.726 12.659
(Short-term Loans/ Reserves) 7.442 7.615 5.302 4.512 15.784 1.867 1.931 1.846 1.495 3.031
) (Short-term Loans/ Reserves) 15.509 16.126 100.080 109.710 -89.633 -21.012 -16.529 -49.515 -11.232 6.302
(Current Acct./ Reserves) -0.240 -0.240 -0.275 -0.209 -0.401 -0.077 -0.079 -0.100 -0.059 -0.163
Growth of Reserves 23.986 24.227 18.157 25.952 6.000 29.363 27.668 32.627 28.786 10.149
Real Interest Rate -30.991 -36.302 -0.844 -30.048 -6.566 46558.35 62339.4 -0.096 66177.35 -0.664
Real Interest Rate Differential -32.775 -37.971 -3.613 -31.549 -9.049 46556.06 62366.31 -2.058 66175.22 -3.193
Real M1 106.933 109.517 82.416 94.981 121.288 116.102 112.920 134.336 115.526 136.435
Real Deposits 67.622 67.712 70.560 N/A N/A 143.968 140.573 151.141 N/A N/A
Real M2 N/A N/A 74.740 91.721 N/A N/A 133.567 149.300
Real Exchange Rate 0.337 0.015 0.269 0.122 -4.968 -0.636 0.000 -5.921 0.053 1.786
(MNB Credit/Total Credit) 0.599 0.655 0.037 0.694 0.510 0.496 0.513 0.493 0.503 0.499
) (MNB Credit/Total Credit) -0.018 -0.020 0.021 -0.004 -0.096 0.041 0.059 0.252 0.035 0.05220
TABLE 2: UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR BANKING CRISES
Variable  Equality of Tranquil and Cri-
ses Periods Before FL
Equality of Tranquil and
Crises Periods After FL
Equality of Crises Periods Be-
fore and After FL
Pre-Crisis Period 18-month 24-month 18-month 24-month 18-month 24-month
Industrial Production -6.275*** -7.114*** 3.197*** 3.262*** 5.034*** 5.505***
) Industrial Production 1.022 -0.723  6.089*** 5.215*** 1.586 3.045***
) Stock Market n.a. n.a. 0.906 2.750*** n.a. n.a.
Real Credit -4.590*** -4.923*** -5.063*** -6.033*** -0.152 -0.742
) Real Credit 0.632 1.858* -2.216** -2.952*** -2.053** -3.841***
) Short-term Loans/Reserves -2.118** -3.673*** -0.412 1.062 1.834* 3.947***
Real Interest Rate 0.754 1.009 -2.466*** -1.404 1.253 3.043***
Real Interest Rate Differential 2.112** 2.198*** -1.459 -0.374 0.812 2.737***
Real M1 2.485*** 2.449** -9.848*** -11.070*** -6.589*** -7.329***
Real Deposits -5.754*** -6.867*** -3.845*** -4.403*** 1.426 1.393
Real Exchange Rate (Deviation from Trend) -0.623 -3.103*** 11.056*** 10.923*** 4.579*** 3.131***
Current Account/Reserves 3.667*** 3.478*** 8.502*** 9.841*** 0.468 1.781*
Short-term Loans/Reserves -4.752*** -4.541*** -1.608 -1.325 4.105*** 3.498***
) Official Reserves 0.112 0.515 0.243 0.239 -0.664 -1.221
MNB Loans/Total Credit -4.800*** -4.347*** 10.048*** 12.350*** 9.182*** 9.936***
) MNB Loans/Total Credit -1.711* -3.103*** 10.048*** 7.212*** 3.460*** 5.864***
*= significance at the 5%-level, **= significance at the 2.5%-level; ***=significance at the 1%-level21
TABLE 3: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR BANKING CRISES
Variable Exp.
Sign
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Logged Trend “ - “ N/A N/A N/A 0.1886*
(0.0975)
N/A








No. of Observations 1075 1074 - 1074 709
Time Fixed Effects No No - No Yes
Log Likelihood -56.9113 -496.6996 - -494.766 -358.823
Chi-Square 145.72 150.23 - 154.09 172.94
Pseudo-R2 0.5615 0.1314 - 0.1347 0.1942
* = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%22
TABLE 4: UNIVARIATE TESTS FOR CURRENCY CRISES
Variable  Equality of Tranquil and Cri-
ses Periods Before FL
Equality of Tranquil and Cri-
ses Periods Before FL
Equality of Crises Periods Be-
fore and After FL
Pre-Crisis Period 18-month 24-month 18-month 24-month 18-month 24-month
Industrial Production 3.061*** 3.944*** 2.572*** 1.495 0.291 -1.572
) Industrial Production 0.659 1.929* 5.789*** 5.798*** 3.466*** 2.686***
Real Credit -10.113*** -11.261*** -8.487*** -7.572*** -2.249** -1.702*
) Real Credit 2.168*** 4.141*** -1.219 0.557 -2.132** -1.962**
) Stock Market 3.314*** 2.265** 3.780*** 4.649*** -1.895* -0.195
Short-Term Loans/Official Reserves -12.744*** -13.866*** -10.088*** -4.765*** 3.567*** 5.093***
) Short-term Loans/Official Reserves -4.689*** -4.331*** -7.252*** -8.819*** -1.263 -4.345***
Real Interest Rate 0.588 1.196 2.949*** 3.456*** 6.598*** 7.329***
Real Interest Rate Differential 2.749*** 2.992*** 2.748*** 3.347*** 5.533*** 6.469***
Current Account Balance/Reserves 14.468*** 15.110*** 11.426*** 11.231*** -1.950* -2.259**
) Foreign Exchange Reserves 8.767*** 7.436*** 11.326*** 12.541*** 0.350 2.957***
Real M1 -9.017*** -10.059*** -7.378*** -7.572*** -0.858 -1.597
Real M2 -6.850*** -8.378*** -3.327*** -7.639*** -0.742 -0.872
Real Exchange Rate (Deviation from Trend) 11.171*** 11.696*** 6.519*** 8.220*** -2.014* -1.099
MNB Credit/Total Credit -2.723*** -5.835*** -2.813*** -4.623*** 0.530 1.295
) MNB Credit/Total Credit 2.052** -1.648* -4.143*** -4.651*** -3.550*** -0.840
*= significance at the 5%-level, **= significance at the 2.5%-level; ***=significance at the 1%-level23
TABLE 5: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR CURRENCY CRISES
Variable Exp.
Sign







(1) (2) (1) (2)
Industrial Produc-
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Logged Trend N/A N/A - -0.3521***
(0.1041)
N/A








No. of Observations 899 1155 - 1155 832
Time Fixed Effects No No - No Yes
Log Likelihood -384.351 -472.983 - -467.316 -386.018
Chi-Square 255.88 161.24 - 172.57 176.64
Pseudo-R2 0.2497 0.1456 - 0.1559 0.1862
* = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%10   GDP figures, balance of payments data and international debt positions are interpolated where
appropriate. 
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TABLE 6: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
10
Variable Name Definition Source
Industrial Production Industrial production index with base=1990 (where available;
where not available the industrial production index has been
replaced - in order of priority - by manufacturing production
index, mining production index, crude petroleum production
index, and gold output index)
IMF
) Industrial Production 12-month change in industrial production index (in percent) IMF
) Stock Market 12-month change in stock market index (in percent) Datastream
Real Interest Rate  Real (CPI adjusted) domestic interest rate (where available
discount rates have been used; where not available the following
interest rates have been used - in order of priority: federal funds





Difference between real (CPI adjusted) domestic interest rate and
respective US rate(in percent)
IMF
Real M1 Index of CPI adjusted M1 with base=1990 IMF
Real M2 Index of CPI adjusted M2 with base=1990 IMF
Real Deposits Index of CPI adjusted deposits with base=1990 IMF
Real Credit Index of CPI adjusted credit with base=1990 IMF
) Real Credit 12-month change of CPI-inflation adjusted domestic credit




Monthly difference of official exchange rate index (base=1990)
adjusted for price level differences between an emerging econ-
omy and the US and its average during tranquil (non-crises)
periods. (in percent)
IMF
) Change in Official
Reserves





Current account balance relative to official reserves (in percent) IMF
Short-term Loans/ Re-
serves





12-month change in total short-term outstanding debt relative to




The ratio of loans by multinational banks relative to total domes-
tic credit (in percent)




12-month change in the ratio of loans by multinational banks
relative to total domestic credit (in percent)
BIS; IMF
Debt/GDP Ratio of total outstanding external debt to GDP IMF; WB
) US $ Value of  Portfo-
lio Investment in Equity
12-month change of the US $ value of portfolio investment in
equity (in percent)
IMF
) US $ Value of Portfo-
lio Investment in Debt
12-month change of the US $ value of portfolio investment in
debt securities (in percent)
IMF
) Unemployment Rate 12-month change in the official unemployment rate (in percent) IMF
) Employment 12-month change in the officially reported employment level (in
percent)
IMF
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, World Debt Tables; BIS, International Banking
and Financial Market Developments; DataStream.26
TABLE 7: OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, 
AND BANKING CRISES
Country Financial Liberalization Banking Crisis
Argentina 1977 03/1980; 05/1985; 1989; 12/1994
Bolivia 1985 10/1987
Brazil 1975 11/1985; 07/1994
Chile 1980 09/1981
Colombia 1980 07/1982
Mexico 1989 09/1982; 09/1992; 09/1994
Paraguay 1990 1995
Uruguay 1976 03/1981
Venezuela 1981 [1984-01/1989: Interest Rate 
Controls Reimposed]; 1989
10/1993
Indonesia 1983  1992





Thailand 1989 03/1979; 10/1983; 05/1997












El Salvador 1991 1989
Peru 1980 [interest rate control reimposed
1984-1990] 1990
04/1989
Sources: Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996; Lindgren,
Garcia and Saal, 199627
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